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IN THE, SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES E. RICHMOND, Executor
of the Estate of WILLIAM B. OUTCALT, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.

Case No.
8755

IVIE W. BALLARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
We agree substantially with appellant's "Statement
of the Case" as far as it goes. However, because the
statement is not complete and because appellant departed
from the issues as state~ both at the trial and in her
brief on appeal, we will make a short statement.
The suit was commenced to set aside a deed obtained
by I vie W. Ballard from the deceased. Appellant's statement is that this was upon the ground that the deed
was procured by "undue influence." We wish to add that
the complaint also alleged that "his mental capacity had
debilitated to the point where it was relatively easy for
his will to be influenced, dominated and overcome" and
"that he required medical attention and was given drugs
for the purpose of relieving pain and acquiring sleep
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and rest." The findings of the court based upon the
allegations and the evidence were that "he was administered drugs for the purpose of alleviating his pain and
was given sleeping pills each night; that there was a
period daily between the time of taking said sleeping
pills and the time that he went to sleep that he was
incompetent to transact business..... That at the time
said William B. Outcalt signed said deed he either had
no knowledge of what he was signing or said signature
was procured by undue influence and was not the voluntary or legal act of said William B. Outcalt; that at said
time said William B. Outcalt w.as incapable of making
a gift or of entering into any agreement with respect
to said property." The grounds for setting aside the deed
were therefore broader than mere "undue influence."
There was evidence of and 1nuch argument based
upon an agreement which \Yas embodied in a codicil to
the decedent's will, the codicil being Exhibit 5 and dated
December 31, 1953. The facts of this transaction were put
in eYidence without objection by either .side. This was
material on the validity of the deed. But there is no
issue of reroYery on a contract. X ot only was none framed
h~· the pleadings, but there could be none for the reason
that no clai1n was filed under Section 15-9--1, l'tah Code
Annotated, 1953. Tllis section provides :
"75-9-4. CLAIM:S TO BE PRESEXTED
\Yl TlllN Til\IE LI~IITS- EXCEPTIOKS.-All
daims arising upon rontrart, whether the same
arP due, not due or contingent, n1ust be presented
within the tilne lilnited in the notice, and any
clailn not presented is barred forever; . . . . "
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See also Halloran Judge Trust Company vs. Heath, 70
Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342.
Mrs. Ballard did claim an agreement had been made
which embodied the codicil. But such f.acts and circumstances are relevant in this case only as they furnish
evidentiary matter for the determination of whether or
not the deed of September 30, 1954, Exhibit 1, was
properly secured. As will be pointed out, the codicil is
material in establishing a course of conduct and motives.
Whether or not Mrs. Ballard rendered service or whether
she carried out her agreement is not material from a
contractual point of view.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

General Chronological Statement.

B.

Mr. Outcalt's Physic.al Condition.

C.

Mr. Outcalt's Mental Condition.

D.

Relationship of Parties.

E.

Simulated Controversy Between Mrs. Ballard,
the Richmonds and Mrs. Brooke.

F.

Third-Party Testimony Regarding Execution of
Deed.

A.

GENERAL CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT.

Appellant's statement of facts is so incomplete that
we deem it necessary to make a full statement. We differ
in some respects with appellant'~ statement.
\Villiam B. Outcalt on September 30, 1954, the date
of the purported deed in question (Exhibit 1), w.as 86
years of age. He had no living blood relatives. :Mrs. Annie
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Brooke was his surviving niece by marriage, her husband having been the nephew of Mr. Outcalt. His wife had
died in 1950. Mr. Outcalt became sick in March 1953 and
was hospitalized and operated on for the partial removal of an incurable tumor (Tr. 50-51). On May 2, 1953
he executed a "Last Will and Testament" in which he
left all of his estate "To Annie C. Brooke of Pasadena,
California, widow of my nephew Lloyd W. Brooke" (Exhibit 3).
Mrs. Ivie W. Ballard, the defendant and appellant
took care of him for a short time in July and August
of 1952 (Tr. 183). She again went to his house to care
for him December 24, 1953 and he continued under her
care until his death March 9, 1956 (Tr. 183). However,
they were some time making arrangements for her to
stay. Prior to the final arrangements she talked to him
many times .about a will or codicil (Tr. 183). She learned
at that time that he had approximately $5,000.00 in money
or valid obligations owing to him (Tr. 300). She suggested that they go to )Ir. l\Iacfarlane, her attorney, to
have the codicil drawn which they did in October 1953
( Tr. 18-l). She and l\fr. Outcalt went to )Ir. )facfarlane's
'Office in October to discuss the matter (Tr. 188). Sometime after October 1~, she picked up a draft of the instrurnent (Tr. 188). The draft wa.s returned to )Ir. Macfarlane December 24, 1953 (Tr. 189). This was the day
on 'vhich she started to take care of hhn. She testified
that the draft w.as corrected by l\[r. Outcalt in his own
handwriting (Tr. 189, Exhibit 17). ("Te do not admit the
<'orrections to be in his handwriting). The codicil was
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signed in Mr. Macfarlane's office December 31, 1953
( Tr. 190, Exhibit 5). The codicil provided that Annie
C. Brooke should receive his household and personal
effects. The re.sidue of the estate was left to I vie Ballard
under certain conditions. These conditions were as follows:
" .... on condition, however, that she personally .attend to my desires and needs for the remainder of my life; all expenses to be taken first
from my funds and in the event they are exhausted then from the personal funds of said I vie
Ballard.
"If this condition be not fulfilled, this devise
shall lapse and the portion of my residue so alloted
(sic) shall pass to Annie C. Brooke or her heirs.
The determination of whether I vie Ballard has
fulfilled the above mentioned condition shall rest
exclusively with my executor hereinafter named."
Walker Bank & Trust Company was named as executor.
She testified that she was not to otherwise be paid
for taking care of him (Tr. 187). Nevertheless, she was
paid money from January 1954 (or possibly December
24, 1953) to the time of his death. She did not discuss
the codicil with anyone (Tr. 187).

Under date of January 4, 1954, just four days after
signing the codicil, l\f r. Outcalt executed an olographic
will (Exhibit 4). This will was found in his safety deposit
box at the Sugar House Branch of Walker Bank & Trust
Co., which also contained the will of May, 1953 (Tr.
90, 94). The olographic will has been admitted to probate
and now constitutes the last will and testament of William
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B. Outcalt (Tr. 94, 96). There was no contest of this
will. The olographic will names Charles E. Richmond
as the sole executor to serve without bond as did the
will of May 1953 (Exhibits 3 and 4). It expressly annuls
and cancels all previous wills. One-third of his estate
is given to Annie C. Brooke of Pasadena, plus all of his
pers-onal effects which she may choose. Ivie Ballard is
given one-third of the residue and the remaining onethird is given to Annie C. Brooke in trust to be distributed to a list of "my dear and helpful friends whose
names I have furnished her with the proportion of said
one-third of my estate which I wish paid to each one."
A list of persons specifying their proportionate share of
the one-third was admitted to probate with the will and
is part thereof (Exhibit 4). It shows that )Ir. and ~Irs.
Richmond received twenty per cent of the one-third.
Mrs. Ballard during the entire illness, received $25
per month for food, medicines and drugs (Tr. 110, 311).
When she requested it she received additional money for
such purposes ( Tr. 110). Conunencing with December :2±,
1953 or January 1, 1954 she received $~5 per month for
services out of l\Ir. Outcalt's funds (Tr. 11±). "\Yhile she
claim~ that she did not want to take any pay she never
refused it (Tr. 115). Starting in July 195±, by check
dated August 2, the anwunt was increased to $100 per
1nonth (Tr. 11-t). This w.as at the suggestion of ~Irs.
B1·ooke after eon~nltation with ~Ir. Outcalt (Tr. 130,
180). The $100 per nwnth continued through January
whPn it was reduced to $50 at the suggestion of

~Ir.

Outealt (Tr. 114). She was paid $75 per n1onth from
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March 1955 until the time of his death. The checks payable to Mrs. Ballard were intfloduced as Exhibit 13. A
list of the checks was introduced as Exhibit 14 (Tr.
115). The checks from January to July 2, 1954 were
signed by Wm. B. Outcalt. From August 2, 1954 until
his death the checks were all signed by Mr. or Mrs.
Richmond. The Richmonds were authorized to sign checks
and to draw on his savings account (Tr. 98-99, Exhibits
6 and 7). Mr. and Mrs. Richmond had a power of attorney
executed in July 1949 by Mr. Outcalt and his wife (See
Exhibit: 2, Tr. 87).
Mr. Outcalt had a very serious illness in July and
August of 1954 (Tr. 54-55). He made a substantial recovery in September of 1954 (Tr. 58). In. the month of
September he arranged to receive the balance owing on
a real estate contract between him and Mr. Siggard (Tr.
171-172). It was testified that he had Mary Glen (true
spelling Glenn), who generally did such work for him,
prepare the deeds (Tr. 172, 306). These deeds were dated
September 22, 1954, just eight days before the deed in
question. The following is Mrs. Ballard's own testimony
as to his custom of having Mary Glen do his stenographir
work:
"Q. Well who conducted the settlement with
the Siggards~
·
"A. Well Mrs. Mary Glen was supposed to
have made the deed out and she was a favorite of
Mr. Outcalts .and he wanted her always to do his
business; you know, any typing or fixing up he
always went to Mary Glen. And so he wanted her
to fix this up." (Tr. 305-306).
He signed the deeds to Mr. Siggard in the presence
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of Lillian D. McConnell and Esther M. Richmond (Tr.
171), who took them to Mr. William Ferguson for notarizati'On (Tr. 171-172). The deeds were returned to Mr.
Outcalt by Mrs. Richmond (Tr. 172). Mr. Outcalt apparently delivered them to Mr. Siggard. The Siggard deeds
were introduced in evidence and are Exhibits 9 and 10.
On September 30, 1954, l\1:r. Outcalt signed the deed
in question, the original deed being introduced in evidence
as Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1, the deed in question, was not typed by
~Iary Glen as in the case of Exhibits 9 and 10, but by
:Mrs. Grace Dent at the request of Mr.s. Ballard (Tr. 84).
The description was prepared from a tax notice (Tr.
291). ::Mrs. Ballard testified that after she had taken the
deed to l\frs. Dent for typing she returned to Mr. Outcalt
f'Or his signature (Tr. 291). She then took the deed to
~Irs. Luchesi to be notarized, who refused to notarize it
without a witness (Tr. ~91). )Irs. Ballard then went to
the house of ~Ir. George E. Dent and took him in her car
driven by her daughter to the house of )Irs. Luchesi.
Mr. Dent then signed as a witness without having seen
l\f r. Outcalt sign, or even knowing him. Mrs. Luchesi then
notarized the instrun1ent also without seeing or talking
to Mr. Outcalt. l\[rs. Luchesi filled in the date of Septeinber 30, lD5-! ( Tr. 80). l\fr. and l\Irs. Dent and l\Irs.
Luchesi are neighbors and friends of )Irs. Ballard, living
approxi1nately one block from her, their addresses being,
l\f rs. Dent, GG:2 South 7th East (':rr. 7:2) : l\frs. Luchesi,
();~7 East 7th South (Tr. 79): l\lrs. Ballard, 656 South
7th East (Tr. :212). Their hmnes .are approxin1ately two
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miles from the Outcalt re.sidence, which is at Redondo
Avenue and Sixth East Street. The deed then remained
in Mrs. Ballard's possession until March 10, 1956, one
day after the death of Mr. Outcalt, at which time she
recorded it (Tr. 232, Exhibit 1).
Under date of December 1, 1954, Mr. Outcalt wrote
a letter addressed to the "Administr.ator of My Estate"
which letter was entirely in his handwriting (Tr. 138).
"Dec. 1, 1954
"To the Administrator 'Of My Estate
"Please settle my estate according to the
terms of my olographic will written and signed by
me last January. The provisions of this will are
just to all concerned and I wish them carried out,
ignoring .and cancelling all other papers which I
may have signed under undue pressure and fear
of being left alone.
William B. Outcalt"
This letter was found after Mr. Outcalt's death in
a drawer of a desk approximately two feet from his bed
(Tr. 170).
Mr. Outcalt'.s funds were substantially exhausted before he died, he having only $150 in checking account,
$59.47 in savings account and $100 cash in safety box
(Tr. 102-103). His estate, in addition to the house, the
title to which is in question, was valued at not to exceed
$1,000 consisting principally of real estate in Emigration
Canyon, in Tooel-e County and in Box Elder County, which
properties the executor has not been able to sell (Tr.
104-107). The funeral expenses of $388 have not yet
been paid (Tr. 107).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
B.

MR. OUTCALT'S PHYSICAL CONDITION.

It is admitted that in April 1953 Mr. Outcalt Wal
hospitalized and operated on for a rare tumor. It wru
impossible to remove it entirely and it was incnr.abl€
(Tr. 51). Appellant states on page 4 that "Outcalt continued to improve from the latter part of August 1953
until shortly before his death." His death was on March
9, 1956 (and not ~iarch 17, 1956 as stated by appellant).
Since we assert that 1Ir. Outcalt's condition gradually
became worse and not better, as stated in appellant's
brief, page 4, we will outline the evidence with regard
to his physical condition.
He

wa~

cared for by Dr. John S. Marshall, who

first treated him in

~Iarch

1953 (Tr. 50). With regard

to pain, the doctor stated:
"A. \Yell the pain produced by his tumor
can be severe, was severe initially when we first
saw him. Large doses of morphine didn~t phase
it .a bit. Subsequent to that time the pain at times
was se\ere. but neYer as severe as initially experienced. The pain is due to pressure on the sacral
bone and pressure on adjacent nerves, which produced pain down both legs. It is pain that comes
and goes. It ahuost alwa~~s would require some
aid in ih• relief. By aid I 1ue.an a narcotic of some
sort.·· (Tr. 54).

II t' had another operation in Decen1ber 1953, two in
,fanuar~· of 19:1-t. and was seriously ill in July and ~lugust
or 1!);)-1- (Tr. 54-55). The July and 4-\.ugust illness was
dP:-;<'ribed a~ critical by the doctor, but the doctor did
not think lw was going to die at that tin1e (Tr. 55). He
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was blind to the extent that he could not re.ad except
through a magnifying glass (Tr. 66). Mr. Richmond
testined that his recovery from the January 1954 operations was quite rapid. He was 'up and around" subsequent to that time. In July he was taken ill again .and
was in bed f·or a number of weeks which lasted from the
middle of July to the latter part of September. His recovery and ability to get out of bed lasted a short time
when he returned to bed and was bedfast substantially
until de.ath (Tr. 98). He had to be lift.ed around (Tr.
267). Last time he got out of bed was summer of 1955
(Tr. 268). Mrs. Ballard gave testimony at great length
as to the extent of the care that was required.
We assert there is .absolutely no basis for the statement on page 4 of appellant's brief that "Outcalt continued to improve from the latter part of August 1953
until shortly before his death."
·C.

l,r

:or.

MR. OUTCALT'S MENTAL CONDITION.

Before referring to the evidence on this subject we
wish to state that we do not contend that Mr. Outcalt's
mind ever deteriorated to the point that he was totally
and permanently incompetent. Any incompetency was
from extreme physical illness, crucial pain, physical dependency on others and at such times as he was under
the influence of drugs. In this connection we call attention
to Section 7;}-13-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
defines an incompetent for the purpose of appointing
a guardian, .as follows:
"75-13-20. INCOMPETENT PERSONSDEFINITIONS. - The words 'inemnpetent,'
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'mentally incompetent' and 'incapable,' as used in
this title, shall be construed to mean any person
who, though not insane, is, by reason of old age,
disease, weakness of mind, or from any other
cause, unable, unassisted, to properly manage and
take care of himself or his property, and by reason
thereof would be likely to be deceived or imposed
upon by artful or designing persons."
The following is the doctor's testimony as to his condition in the summer of 1954:
"A. Well, his tumor began to recur again
in lVIay of '54 and produced pain. Again we urged
that he come to the hospital and let us attempt its
removal in part, at least, which would relieve his
pain. However, he declined to do that. As the
pain became more pronounced, more steady and
more severe, he required larger doses of pain relieving medicine, so that he was unable to eat and
he rapidly lost strength and became practically
bedfast." (Tr. 55).
As for the use of drugs, the doctor testified:
,. A. He would norn1ally or usually take two
capsules of sodiun1 amytal of three grain size,
on around I :00 in the evening, at which tune he
"·ished to go to sleep for the night. That dose
would be six grains of sodium amytal. Occasionally he would take an additional capsule in the
1niddle of the night and endeavor to sleep until
morning. The duration of these drugs is from six
to eight hours. If one is in pain you will awake
even at a shorter time than that, but "ith the six
hour tinw inteiT.al. as you can see, ~Ir. Outcalt
would awaken in the middle of the night and he
would often require a second five grains before
nwrning, so that during the night he would get
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
nine grains of sodium amytal, the pain tablet
called percodan, that is a relatively mild pain
relieving drug, it is synthetic opiate and was well
tolerated by him. He took large amounts of aspirin
compounds, too." (Tr. 55-56).
With respect to the dosage, the following is the
question and answer:

"Q. Now relative to the sleeping pills and
the dosage you have mentioned is that a relatively
heavy dose or a light dose, Doctor~
"A.

That is a whale of a dose.

"Q. That is larger than you normally are
required to give a p,atient ~
"A. Yes sir, it is." (Tr. 56).
With respect to his competency when taking drugs
the doctor stated :
"After two or three hours when the medicine
was in full effect I wouldn't think he would be
very competent." (Tr. 57).
There would be a time when he would be very foggy
(Tr. 57). He was totally dependent on Mrs. Ballard
(Tr. 57).
He was given hypodermic injections of demerol,
"which is a more potent opiate for more severe pain
when this percodan didn't give him full relief." (Tr. 64).
The doctor never saw him during the height of the
drug action (Tr. 68). On a direct question the doctor
testified that there would be a period during the time
of the drug action when he was incompetent to tr.ansact
business (Tr. 71).
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Mr. Richmond te_stified that there were occasions
when Mr. Outcalt did not know him and would ask who
the visitor was (Tr. 109). Mr. and Mrs. Richmond handled all of his business affairs during most of the illness
(Tr. 98). There were times when Mr. Richmond would
try to talk to Mr. Outcalt about his busine_ss and he
would say, "I don't want to talk about it." There were
other times when he was not able to talk about ·business
affairs (Tr. 109). He told ~Ir. Richmond to conduct
his affairs as he wanted to after July 1954 (Tr. 122).
D.

RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIES.

Because, as will hereinafter be pointed out, Mrs.
Ballard tried to create the impre.ssion at the trial that
the Richmonds were not ~Ir. Outcalt's friends, but were
antagonistic to him and ~Irs. Ballard, it is important to
determine the true relationship ·of the parties. "'rith
the possible exception of ~Irs. Brooke there was no one
besides Mrs. Ballard who expected to receive anything
fr01n :Jf r. Outcalt's estate. The Richmonds had known
:J[r. Outcalt since 1925 (Tr. S7). ~Ir. Richmond knew of
the l\Iay 1953 will which gave all of the estate to .Annie
C. Brooke. It nanred ~Ir. Riclnnond as the executor
(Exhibit 3). The Rich1nonds knew nothing of the codicil
nor of the olographic will (Tr. 1~0). The Richmonds
<'X}Wrtrrl nothing. The Rielnnonds Yisited hi1u often and
faithfully managed his business affairs (Tr. 98, 99, 100,
107, 109, 119, 180). 1\fr. Richnrond was a party to in<'n'a~ing- t hr pay of l\[ rs. Ballard in July of 1954 as was
AnniP C. Brooke (Tr. 130). The Riclnnonds were neigh-
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bors of Mr. Outcalt, living only a few houses away at
563 Redondo Avenue (Tr. 86).
As above pointed out, Mrs. Ballard started taking
care of Mr. Outcalt on December 24, 1953 with the express
thought in her mind that she would be paid under the
terms of the codicil, which was known only to her, and
her lawyer. She was to care for Mr. Outcalt during his
life without pay and until his funds were exhausted,
after which time she was to use her own funds. If this
were carried out she was to receive the residue of his
estate (Exhibit 5). As pointed ·out in the statement of
issues there is no attempt to enforce this agreement.
If she had claimed anything under this agreement there
would have been an issue as to the making or validity
of the agreement, which issue was never tried. Certainly
there would have been an issue of performance and the
effect of her receiving pay. The fact that four days after
the codicil was executed Mr. Outcalt made .an olographic
will eontrary to the terms of the codicil indicates how
he felt about the codicil. She knew the approximate
amount of money on hand at the time of the codicil and
that such cash would be exhausted if he lived long enough
and that at such time she would be required to keep
him with her own money. Mrs. Ballard was in the relationship of a full time nurse and housekeeper. She purchased and administered the drugs ( Tr. 65, 311). In her
own language she states:
"Well I wouldn't say I was a nurse. I went
there to take care of him and be a housewife and
make a home." (Tr. 183).
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The doctor gave Mrs. Ballard instructions for the
administration of drugs ( Tr. 65). Her attorney stated
in court that she went there as a nurse ( Tr. 196).
E. SIMULATED CONTROVERSY BETWEEN
BALLARD, THE RICHMONDS AND MRS. BROOKE.

MRS.

Mrs. Ballard attempted by her testimony to show
some controversy between the Richmonds and Mrs.
Brooke on the one side and herself and Mr. Outcalt on
the other. Mrs. Ballard's testimony on this is unsupported
by other testimony and is contrary to other indisputable
facts.
Mrs. Ballard testified that in 1953 Mrs. Brooke
called her up and told her she, )Irs. Ballard, was not
capable of taking care of him, saying, '·\re have got to
have a nurse" (Tr. 192). This, if true, need not be taken
as any personal objection to )Irs. Ballard, but only
anxiety for Mr. Outcalt's welfare. Howe\er, the testimony
was as if there was a personal controversy. )Irs. Ballard
stated that ~Ir. Outcalt said that he had been high pressured many times by the Richmonds and the McConnells
and he had done things he wished he had not done (Tr.
193). \Yhat these things were or could have been were
not diselosed. After testifying that she had taken the
eodicil out of the safety deposit box at the Continental
Hank & Trust C01npany, and placed it on the shelf at
the Outcalt residence, she intimated that the seals on
the envelope containing the codicil had been disturbed
b~r l\1 r~. Bielnnond (Tr. :2S7-:2SS). If she saw it and left
it there it indicates friendship for Mrs. Ballard and not
antagonism.
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Mrs. Ballard further stated that at the time he is
supposed to have given her the deed he said:
" 'You have earned it and you deserve it.'
And he said Mrs. Brooke, he called her Annie,
he s.aid, 'She is no blood relative of mine,' and
he says, 'that she could buy you and I out several
times' and he said, 'I don't owe her anything and
I don't owe the Richmonds anything,' he said, 'but
they think that they own 1ne.' " (Tr. 292).
With respect to the deed she testified:
"He said 'You can go and have it recorded if
you want to but,' he says, 'you might have trouble
but,' he says, 'you keep this in your presence .always until I go.' And then he says, 'You can have
it recorded,' you can have it recorded at the time
he said, 'but it might cause you some trouble.'"
(Tr. 292-293).
The confidence which lVIr. Outcalt had in the Richmonds is borne out by the fact that they took care of
his business affairs all through his sickness until the
time of death. They deposited his money and wrote the
checks when he wasn't able to do so. They had had a
power of attorney since 1949. The .authorizations to draw
money and write checks are dated in March and April1953
and were never revoked (Exhibit 6 and 7). The only will
known to them (Exhibit 3) provided nothing for the
Richmonds except that Mr. Richmond should be the
executor. He was again named executor in the olographic
will which has been admitted to probate. Mr. Richmond,
as well as 1\frs. Brooke, participated in raising Mrs.
Ballard's pay from $25 per month to $100 per
month in July 1954. We submit that there was no basis
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for any claim of antagonism on the part of the Richmonds. They served only as good neighbors to Mr. Outcalt and co-operated with Mrs. Ballard in taking care
of him. The claimed antagonism is entirely of Mrs. Ballard's own making and is contrary to the undisputed
facts.
F. THIRD-PARTY TESTIMONY REGARDING EXECUTION OF DEED.
~Irs.

Ballard called seven witnes.ses who purported
to give conversations with 1\{r. Outcalt supporting the
claimed fact that he had deeded the property to Mrs.
Ballard. These witnesses were : Virgil M. Taylor, Sarah
Ann Sexton \Vest, Pearl Foster, Amy Pratt Romney,
~lay ~Iarkham, Thelma Taylor and Clark H. \\.,.est. Most
of these people were close personal friends of Mrs. Ballard. X eyertheless their testimony, considering that they
were called by ~Irs. Ballard, is as significant for the
plaintiff as for the defendant.
Yirgil ~L Taylor lived across the street from llr.
Outcalt for 10 years (Tr. 198). He testified that in 1952
~r r. Outcalt said that, "lie would be glad to give someone the balance of his estate when he died if they would
take care of hiin for the rest of his life (Tr. 200-202).
He ~aid he neyer Yisited ~Ir. Outcalt after ~Irs. Ballard
c<une ( Tr. ~0~-~03). These conYersations being long before the supposed deed and eYen before the olographic
will proved nothing with regard to the execution and
delivery of the deed. The olographic will shows a compiPt<' change of 1nind if in fact he had such an intent.
Sarah Ann Sexton \Yest lives at 536 East Second
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South and has known Mrs. Ballard for 40 years (Tr.
204). She testified that while Mrs. Ballard was at the
hospital for a few days Mr. Outcalt had said, " 'I hope
Ivie comes back from the hospital and can stay with
me as long as I live.' ... 'And I am giving her this place,
deeding this place to her if she stays with me until the
last.'" This was in December of 1955 (Tr. 206);
Though this was more than a year after the deed,
it was only a statement of future intention and was
conditioned on her staying with him. It negatives the fact
that he had given a deed.
Pearl Foster living at 50 East Fifth South had previously lived next door to Mr. Outcalt (Tr. 237). She had
known Mrs. Ballard since 1951 (Tr. 238). Mrs. Foster
testified, "Well he told me that he was thinking about
leaving his home to Mrs. Ballard" (Tr. 240). Mrs. Foster
could not fix the exact time of this conversation, but
said, "I imagine maybe it w.as '54. I'm not sure" (Tr.
241). She also said it was around the time Mrs. Ballard's
brother died (Tr. 240). This date was never established.
In response to the judge's questions she said she was
not sure of the year (Tr. 243).
Mrs. Amy Pratt Romney who lives at 1523 East
Ninth South (Tr. 245) testified that when Mr. Outcalt
moved from his home in Cottonwood he lived in the
Romney's apartment for a period of 18 months to two
years ( Tr. 245). He moved from their home when he
purchased the residence at Sixth East and Redondo
Avenue (Tr. 245). She and her husband (Mr. Gaskell
Romney, now deceased) used to visit the Outcalts (Tr.
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245). Their last visit was around Christmastime of 1954
( Tr. 249). Mr. Romney said, "You seem to be taken
care of very well and I feel that it would be very sad
if you didn't make things worthwhile for Mrs. Ballard
after your demise." She then testified, "Mr. Outcalt's
reply was that Mrs. Ballard had been very kind to him
and had kept things in very good order and that he, now
I don't say whether he said, 'I have' or 'I will see to it
that Mrs. Ballard is well cared for after my demise" (Tr.
248).
This conversation was about three months after the
supp<>sed deed. ~Ir. Outcalt, though Mr. Romney insisted
that ~Irs. Ballard was very de.serving and things should
be worthwhile for her, said nothing about a deed. :Mrs.
Romney was questioned extensively on the witness stand
for more favorable testimony, but none was forthcoming.
l\Ir. Outcalt's statement is much more consistent with
the olographic will adlnitted to probate than with havmg
given any deed. The mutual esteem between llr. Outcalt
and :JI r. Romney would haYe called for a statement with
regard to the deed if Jlr. Outcalt had intended to give,
or known or thought he had given a deed.
nfay l\iarkham, who lives at 308 East Second South
and ha~ known nirs. Ballard since 19:2S, stated that in
the first week in October of 1954, ~Ir. Outcalt said, "And
[ ha.vt> provided for ~irs. Ballard that she will be well
taken eartl of when I go for her kindness and for her
loving can' for n1e" (Tr. :255). This is no 1nore evidence
of the deed than of the olographic will.
Thehna '1_1aylor testified that she liYed at 2013 South
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Sixth East. She asked Mr. Outcalt if he had taken care
of Mrs. Ballard and he said, "Yes, I have. But don't
tell the neighbors." This was in October 1954 (Tr. 259).
There w.as nothing with respect to any deed or any specific date.
Clark H. West testified that he resided at 526 East
Second South and has known Mrs. Ballard for 43 years
(Tr. 260-261). He testified with regard to a conversation
about Mrs. Ballard in February 1955 that, " ... I have
provided for her and nobody can take this home aw.ay
from her." (Tr. 265).
The only persons out of these seven who testified
to anything which would indicate that a deed had been
given were the Wests. They were friends of Mrs. Ballard
of 40-years standing and were her close neighbors. None
of the others testified to any conversation which indicates that a deed had been given and in each instance
:Mr. Outc.alt, if he were trying to reassure friends of
.Nirs. Ballard that he was taking care of her would certainly have mentioned giving her the property or a deed
to it. This is particularly true of the Romneys, Mr.
Romney having twice pressed Mr. Outcalt for reassurance that Mrs. Ballard would be taken care of.
Some inference might be drawn from the fact that
these people were concerned about l\Irs. Ballard. There
were others who were giving time and attention without
pay. Mrs. Ballard's services were obvious, the others
were not. None of them knew that Mrs. Ballard w.as receiving pay and of course none of them knew that she
was a beneficiary of one-third of the residue of the estate.
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In any event the testimony of these seven witnesse.s taken
a.s .a whole, considering their friendship for Mrs. Ballard,
the solicitations for her welfare and the opportunity for
disclosure of the deed, does as much to disprove her
case as to prove it.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE FINDING OF THE
COURT.
POINT 2
EXHIBIT 11 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.
POINT 3
ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT 11 IS NONPREJUDICIAL.
POINT 4
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF.
ARGF~IEXT

POINT 1
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE FINDING OF THE
COURT.

\Vhile this is an equity case in which tllis court may
exarnine the record it should not be forgotten that the
trial judge sa"· and heard the witnesses. Characteristics
of thr witnPssPs are displayed at the trial wllich cannot
be rPI'IPch•d in the record. \Yhile we do not kno'v precisely
what PvideneP .see1ned most i1nportant to the trial judge,
on r a rgnmrnt that the deed was iinproperly secured is
as follows:
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:Mrs. Ballard was definitely motivated in taking care of
Mr. Outcalt by a pecuniary interest in his property. Before deciding to care for Mr. Outcalt, she determined
that he had approximately $5,000.00 in cash or its equivalent besides the residence in which he was living. He
was in hi.s middle 80's and in poor health, suffering from
an incurable tumor. She procured a codicil to his will
which would pay her well, considering his probable
length of life. His life expectancy could not have been
long. That she was capable of exerting pressure on Mr.
Outcalt is indicated by the fact that she had the codicil
drawn by her ·own attorney, taking possession of the
codicil and retaining it until his death. He was not permitted to place it in his safety box where he kept the
will which the codicil amended. There is no doubt that
there was something secretive about it. On January 4,
1954, four days after the signing of the codicil he revoked
it by an olographic will which is now .admitted to probate
without contest. Mr. Outcalt put this document in his
safety box at the bank.
~Irs. Ballard testified that she was fully aware of
the terms of the codicil which did not contemplate that
she be paid by the month. The pay she received was
contrary to its terms. To have told the Richmonds th.at
she wasn't entitled to monthly payments under the supposed agreement would have required the disclosure of
the codicil. This she did not want to do, even though the
Richmonds had no pecuniary interest in the prior will.
In July 1954 the pay was increased to $100.00 per month
because of added service. Whether she earned more or
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less than she was paid is not material. It is material
that such pay was not included in the terms of the codicil
and she had reason to believe its provisions for her were
in je·opardy.
When Mr. Outcalt recovered from his serious illness
of July and August 1954, he was able to consummate
the sale of property to Mr. Siggard. His prospect for
extended life temporarily increased. At that time he arranged to have the Siggard deeds prepared and he signed
them. It will be noticed that his signatures on these deeds
are clear and firmly written. He had the deeds prepared
in the usual way by ~Iary Glen. His recovery no doubt
caused some concern on the part of Mrs. Ballard as to
how long he might live and whether to comply with the
codicil she might be required to use her own money for
his support. So she procured the deed. This would protect her against failure to perform under the codicil,
either by having received pay as she went along or
against failure to use her own money. In using her own
n1oney, she would have been required to disclose the
term~ of the codicil to ~Ir. Outcalt's other friends. This
for the reason that the Riclunonds were paying the bills.
The peculiarities of this deed n1ust be noted. :Jirs.
Glen wa~n't called in to type the deed, as had been done
eight da~·~ before. :J[r. Outcalt undoubtedly had a deed
or abstract frmn wrhich he would nonnally ha,·e taken
tiH' description. The description was taken from a tax
uot i<'t'. The ~ignatnn• on tlw deed (Exhibit 1) is \NY
::;lmk~· and i~ decidedly inferior to an~- other signatures
both before and after Septe1nber 30, 1954. The signatures
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to be compared are to be found on Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5,
9, 10, 11 and 12. Mrs. Ballard administered the drugs
which, as testified by the doctor, would result in a period
of incompetency.
The deed is further irregular in that it recites no
consideration, no one saw him sign except Mrs. Ballard,
and it w.as improperly witnessed and acknowledged by
Mrs. Ballard's friends and neighbors. At the time of
the witnessing and acknowledging Mrs. Ballard traveled
in a car driven by her daughter. The notary, Mrs. Esther
T. Luchesi, objected to taking the acknowledgment. Mrs.
Ballard could easily have driven Mrs. Luchesi to the
home of Mr. Outc.alt only two miles distance and have
had Mr. Outcalt personally acknowledge the deed. Her
daughter's car was immediately available. Instead of this
she drove to Mr. Dent's house. She was then able to
secure a witness and the notarization. She then retained
the deed in her own possession until .after his death, at
which time she recorded it. Knowledge of the deed was
withheld from all persons except the daughter, the witness
and the notary. The deed recites no consideration, the
name of the county is not inserted in the acknowledgment, and the signature of the notary is misplaced.
There was an attempt to make a point of the fact
that the Siggard deeds were not acknowledged before
a Notary public and that Mr. Outcalt was fully aware
of this fact. The two witnesses who signed those deeds saw
.Mr. Outcalt sign them. They had no pecuniary interest in
the matter and the deeds were given pursuant to a con-
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tract which Mr. Outcalt had entered into for the sale of
property. Mr. Outcalt was fully paid.
There is no evidence outside of Mrs. Ballard's own
testimony that anyone would have opposed Mr. Outcalt's
doing that which he wanted to do with his property. He
had friends no doubt who would oppose his doing something under pressure or undue influence. These friends
voluntarily participated in raising ~Irs. Ballard's pay,
which diminished his estate. Their first concern was his
welfare while he lived. The Richm.onds who were handling Mr. Outcalt's affairs had no reason to believe that
they were or would be the beneficiaries of his will. The
only thing that ~Irs. Ballard had to fear was that Mr.
Outcalt himself had done something against his own
desires.
That he had done something again.st his own desires
was indicated by the olographic will and the letter of Dec.
1, 193-!, Exhibit 11. There is no question but that the
estate which ~Ir. Outcalt intended to leave included his
residence. All other property is valued at less than
$1,000.00. Only a Sinall part of this is in cash and the
rmnainder has no ready 1narket. Fron1 tins must be paid
tlH' rxpenses of last illness. funeral expenses and cost of
probate. \rould .Jlr. Outcalt lwYe intended to give onethird of t lw residue of $1,000.00 to· ~Irs. Ballard, onethird to Annie Brooke and the other one-third to be
divided among eight friends·?
rplH•rp was son1e argnmrnt in the trial court as to
tlw

nmtPrialit~·

11)

h<'<':lHS<'

of the letter of Dece1nber 1, 1954 (Exhibit
it did not specifically refer to the deed as
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an instrument to be ignored and cancelled. If Mr. Outcalt's mind was in .a clouded condition from drugs, pain
or otherwise, he would not necessarily have known what
he had signed. A recollection that he had signed something under pressure would be expected. His mind was
clear when he wrote the letter and referred to his olographic will as the instrument of final distribution of
his property.
We would like to call attention of the court to one
instance which illustrates a willingness on the part of
Mrs. Ballard to go to any length to sustain her case.
Exhibit 17 was introduced by her counsel as the draft of
the codicil which Mr. Outcalt is supposed to have read
and corrected in his handwriting. The only corrections
were an item stricken out and the insertion of the initial
"B" in Mr. Outcalt's name. It had been suggested that
this draft had been read and corrected by Mr. Outcalt
in his handwriting. The following are the questions and
answers:

"Q.

Was it returned with those penciled no-

tations~

"A.

Yes sir.

"Q. Do you know who made

those~

''A. Mr. Outcalt." (Tr. 221)
That this was his handwriting is claimed in her brief
where it is stated at page 16, "She later returned it to
his office with some penciled corrections Inade by Mr.
Outcalt."
An examination of the inserted "B" on Exhibit 17
and a comparison with the "B" of the signatures of Mr.
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Outcalt shows such a marked difference that there is
no possibility of their having been written by the same
person.
The plaintiff necessarily could not re-enact the scene
when the deed was signed to show Mr. Outcalt's mental
condition or the pressure and influence exerted upon
him by Mrs. Ballard. The nature of this case and similar
cases never permits of such proof. The following authorities deal with the proof required by a plaintiff in such
cases and also with the question of presumption of invalidity where the relationship is such as existed between
Mr. Outcalt and Mrs. Ballard.
In the case of Howard rs. Carter, 80 Pac. 61, the
action was to set aside a deed to real estate to two sonsin-law of the decedent. The decedent at the time of the
deed was 76 years old and in poor health. \Yith regard to
the evidence required to set aside such a deed, the court
said:
"3. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence
a de1nurrer was interposed thereto and overruled.
It is claimed that there was no eYidence warranting the setting aside of the deeds, because there
was nothing to show that these deeds had been
obtained by undue persuasion or influence by
Howard and Clark or their "iYes. The allegation
of the petition was that while Schuster was weak,
both bodilY and Inentalh-. and thus easilY influenced, the defendants Clark and Howard, '~ith the
assistance of their wiYes. 'coaxed, persuaded, and
unduly influenced him. the snid Conrad Schuster,
to ronve~· and deed to the1n all his real estate.'
Tlwn~ was no spt.:~eific evidence whateYer of any
eoaxing, persuasion. or undue influence. It was
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shown that while Conrad Schuster was in a weak
and mentally unsound condition he made these
deeds, conveying all of his property to his two
sons-in-law, without any consideration whatever
therefor. We are of the ·opinion that this was sufficient evidence to be considered by the court upon
the issue presented by the petition. In the nature
of things, it would be a rare case where the details
of conversation or conduct could be shown, indicating undue persuasion and influence, as such
arts would be exercised only in the absence of
witnesses, or, at most, in the presence of those
whose interest and inclination would impel to their
denial. \V e may as well judge of the cause from
an effect, as of the effect from a cause. The fact
that one mentally infirm does these things might
of itself lead to the fair and just conclusion that
he was impelled thereto by undue persuasion and
influence, and, this fact being proven, we think
it sufficient to sustain the allegation of the petition. Paddock v. Pulsifer, 43 Kan. 718, 23 Pac.
1049; Hill v. Miller, 50 Kan. 659, 32 Pac. 354."
See also Hill v. Miller 32 Pac. 354; Smith v. Smith,
11-t Pac. 2-15; Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley, 72 Utah
-174, 271 Pac. 797; Bank of America, etc. v. Crawford,
160 P. :2d 169; Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439, 145
S.W. 2d 807; Gilbert v. Marquis, 61 R.I. 302, 200 Atl.
959 ~ Corporation of Latter-day Saints v. Watson, 25 Utah
-15, 69 Pac. 531 and Miller v. Livingstone, 31 Utah -t 15,
88 Pac. 388.
The last case cited is of interest as it indicates that
under the facts in this case Mrs. Ballard would have
had the burden to prove the validity of the codicil. !-leadnote 3 of that case states:
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"3. SAME. The sole beneficiary in a will
gave instructions for the will and directed its
terms. It was drawn at her request. Held, that the
will must be regarded as having been written by
the beneficiary within the rule casting suspicion
on .a will drawn at the request and direction of
the sole beneficiary which may be sufficient to
prevent the probate thereof unless the suspicion
is removed. "
POINT 2
EXHIBIT 11 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.

·The letter written by William B. Outcalt on December 1, 1954 was just sixty-two days after the date of
the purported deed. The letter is written in a much
firmer handwriting than the signature on the deed, and
there was never any question as to his handwriting.
The letter states :
"December 1, 1954
"To the Administrator of l\Iy Estate
"Please settle my estate according to the
terms of my olographic will written and signed
by me last January. The provisions of this will
are just to all concerned and I wish them carried
~out, ignoring and cancelling all other papers which
I may have signed under undue pressure and fear
of being left alone.
\Yillian1 B. Outcalt"
By directing his adnlinistrator to carry out the provisions of his olographie will and to ignore and cancel
all other papers, ''which I may haYe signed under undue
pressure and fear of being left ,alone,~· ~Ir. Outcalt plainly
had referC'lH'P to thE' po~~ihility of his haYing signed
some instru1nent din•sting hin1self of n1ost of his estate.
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It is too plain for labored argument that the letter of
December 1, 1954 is relevant to the issues of undue influence and abuse of a confidential relation.ship that
were tried in this lawsuit. The weight of the evidence
is a matter of argument.
There is at the present date, a great number of decisions which have followed and elaborated upon the
rule laid down by this court in Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah
260, 228 Pac. 911, to the effect that subsequent (or prior)
declarations made by a grantor or donor, etc., are admissible in an equity case on the issue of intent and it is
immaterial that such statements are self serving and
hearsay declarations.

California: Williams v. K idd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1;
Piercey v. Piercey, 18 Cal. App. 751,124 Pac.
561; Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal. 2d 523, 127 P.
2d 530; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 2d
200, 134 P. 2d 323; Katz v. Enos, 68 Cal. App.
2d 266, 156 P. 2d 461; Sprague v. Walton,
145 Cal. 228, 78 Pac. 645; McNulty v. Copp,
91 Cal. App. 2d 484, 205 P. 2d 438; Hansen
v. Bear Film Co., 28 Cal. 2d 154, 168 P. 2d
946; Casey v. Casey, (Cal. 1950) 218 P. 2d
842; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, (Cal. 1953) 261
P. 2d 321; Emden v. Verdi, (Cal. 1954) 269
P. 2d 47.
Idaho:
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Ida. 470, 199 P.
2d 264.
..7J1ontana:
Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 187
P. 2d 1018.
New Mexico: Schultz v. Young, 37 N.M. 427, 24 P. 2d 276.
Utah:
Mower v. Mower,64 Utah260, 228 P,ac. 911;
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.
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2d 355; Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94
P. 2d 465; First Security Bank v. Burgi, 122
Utah 443, 251 P. 2d 297.
See also the annotation at 34 A.L.R. 2d. 592.
There is a well recognized rule of law that the solemnity of deeds cannot be later attacked by parol testimony.
Ruthrauff, et al. v. Silver King Western Min. and Mill
Co., 95 Utah 279,80 P. 2d 338; Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal.
631, 151 Pac. 1 (cited in the Mower case). But this legal
policy assun1es that the deed has been duly executed and
delivered with all the proper formalties of law. \Vbere
an action raises equitable issues such as fraud, mistake,
undue influence or abuse of a confidential relationship,
which cases necessarily involve the question of a valid
delivery as well as execution, the cases cited above have
all admitted so-called self-serving hearsay declarations.
The instant case is more favorable to such ruling because
the statement is not oral but in the handwriting of the
supposed grantor.
There is no doubt whatsoever that "\Villiam B. Outcalt wrote the letter of December 1st (Tr. 1-10). Thus
the historic objection that a hearsay staten1ent may be
erroneously reported or repeated by the witness, is eliminat,ed. This case deals with a quitclain1 deed, highly
questionable in every circu1nstance. Just like the day
when defendant took Thfr. Outcalt to her attorne·y· to have
a will drawn in her favor, this ti1ne the defendant went to
her own close aeqaintance to have the deed typed, rather
than to l\1 a r~· ( Hrn, who typed the Siggard deeds tlw
week before. There wa~ no actual witnessing of the deed,
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nor acknowledgment. And therefore the protection of Mr.
Outcalt's free exercise of his will and intent that our
statutes on acknowledgments were designed to provide,
was removed. 57-2-8 to 15, inclusive, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The language of the Mower case is particularly apt to this situation.

"It would seem on principle to say that these
statements are self serving and inadmissible after
the delivery of the deed is really begging the question. It may be conceded that they are inadmissible after the delivery of the deed but the real issue
here is, were the deeds ever legally delivered? If
we assume the declarations are not admissible
because the deeds have been delivered, then we are
settling the issue of delivery without evidence or
trial." (64 Utah at 268)
It is clear that the question of Mr. Outcalt's free
exercise of his own volition in executing and delivering
the deed is a matter, indistinguishable from the question
of intent in delivering a deed in the Mower case. There
cannot be a valid delivery of a deed that was procured
through undue influence.
The Utah decision of Smith v. Hanson, 34 Utah 171,
96 Pac. 1088, cited in appellant's brief, is distinguished
from the Mower case by the per curiam opinion written
on Rehearing therein, 64 Utah at 272.
The case of Ruthrauff, et al. v. Silver King Western
.~.lfining and Mill Company, et al., 95 Utah 279, 80 P. 2d
338, cited by appellant is consistent with the ruling of
the trial court herein. It was an action to quiet title to a
certain mining claim. It was undisputed that Charles B.
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Ruthr.auff and wife executed a deed to Rose Brown, valid
in all respects, quitclaiming an undivided one-fourth interest in the Augusta Lode mining claim. Thereafter
Ruthrauff's heirs claimed that the deed did not divest
the grantor of the interest he held in the property, but
was merely intended to release to Rose Brown the onefourth interest in the property which she had held, but
which had been invalidly sold for taxes. The Supreme
Court held that "unless the intent and meaning of the
deed is upon its f.ace uncertain or obscure," no recourse
could be taken to such facts as subsequent asserted ownership by the grantor.
"So far as appears, Mr. Ruthrauff, the grantor, never claimed there was fraud, accident or
mistake in the deed during the more than ten
years he lived thereafter. His heirs in .all the
26 years since his death in 1912 until this suit,
never questioned it.... No one was produced as
a witness to testify so as to throu· any light on
intent at the time, aside from the deed itself....
No issue is tendered on which to impress an equitable interest upon the legal title now held by another. The attempt to read into the later tax
records .a controlling effect over a prior express
deed of their ancestor cannot prevail. . . . It is
sufficient to say, giving to the deed in question
its due legal effect, that title to the interest formerly held and owned by Charles C. Ruthrauff
(to the extent of 375 feet or less) passed thereby
to Rose Brown.... " 95 Ptah at :291 (En1phasis
added.)
POINT 3
ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT 11 IS NONPREJUDICIAL.

In disrnssing this point we do not adn1it that Exhibit
1 t and Exhibit 1:2. being the envelope containing Exhibit
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11, were erroneously admitted. H~owever, it is our position that even if they may have been incompetent evidence it was nonprejudicial error. First, because the evidence sustains the finding of the trial court without Exhibit 11 and second, the defendant gave evidence of transactions which would otherwise have been inadmissible
under the dead man statute if Exhibit 11 had not been
admitted. The trial court held that Exhibit 11 constituted
a waiver of the dead man statute, Section 78-24-2, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. Pursuant to the waiver the defendant introduced the supposed conversations between
her and the decedent regarding the deed.
A review of the record with regard to the theory
on which the court admitted Exhibit 11 and the conversations between the defendant and the decedent will be
helpful. We refer first to page 140 of the transcript
where the court stated the theory upon which Exhibit 11
was admitted. The court said:
". . . You see this is a statement of the deceased. The very issue in this case is whether or
not he was imposed upon or whether he knew what
he was doing. That is the issue. Now can there
be better evidence than what his own mind was
by his own statement~ Now if a witness were
testifying that he had said that of course, true,
they couldn't testify as to whether or not that was
his state of mind. They could only testify that
that is what he said was his state of mind. It
seems to me that where the issue is as to that
mental status of the deceased and that is the very
crux ,of this case and you have a statement by
him in writing, about which there is no contest
that it was his writing, I don't know how you could
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get a better insight as to what his mind was than
to what he says it wa.s." (Tr. 140-141).
This theory of the court is in line with Mower v.
Mower, supra, .and with the other authorities set forth
in our preceding point.
Mr. Macfarlane had asked questions with regard to
the conversations with the deceased about the deed in
question and the court had, during the first part of the
trial excluded the testimony. It is intere.sting that counsel for defendant argued that there being no jury the
evidence should be .admitted and the court could disregard such evidence as might be held incompetent. Mr.
Macfarlane, Jr., stated :
"I think we ought to maybe have an opportunity to take a look at that. Unfortunately \Ye
didn't before but this will be important and of
course there being no jury the Court could always
disreg.ard it if at some subsequent time it should
be determined that it is incompetent." (Tr. 222).
Before the trial was concluded the court held that
the introduction of Exhibit 11 was a waiver of the dead
man statute by the plaintiff and l\Irs. Ballard was permitted to testify with regard to the entire transaction.
In making its ruling the court said:
"Well, it is the same situation, :Jir. Cannon,
that I think the Burke Y. Peters case (Burk v.
Peter, 115 Utah 58, 202 P. 2d 5±3) covers and I
think that theory is that it is a waiYer and that
lettPr is, you see that letter he has written to be
opened after hi~ dcn7~l c.ast~ a doubt on all of this
tran~aetion, if it applies to it at all. And he has
said in that letter that he has been in1posed upon.
'Yell, he i~ ~pPaking, and to the extent that he
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speaks this c.ase as I understand it, hold that it
qualifie.s her to speak. She has the right to explain
or rebut or contest that speaking that he has done
through that letter, and that is the the·ory of the
case." (Tr. 289).
Following this statement, counsel for defendant had
Mrs. Ballard testify as to the supposed conversation between her and the deceased when he gave her the deed.
It is certain from the ruling of the court and from the
entire record that the only theory upon which her conversation with the deceased could be given was a waiver
of the de.ad man statute by the introduction of Exhibit
11. We do not know to what extent the letter and the supposed conversations influenced the trial judge in the
final decision. If there was error on one side then there
was error on both sides. There is no need to decide the
single question of whether or not the trial judge was
correct in his ruling that the introduction of Exhibit 11
was a waiver of the dead man statute as the decision w.as
entirely in favor of the plaintiff. It is conclusive, however,
from the trial judge's own theory and the entire record
of the case that defendant could not have testified as to
her conversation with regard to the deed unless Exhibit
11 had been admitted.
The following is the rule with regard to the admission of incompetent evidence in an equity case if the
findings, in the opinion of the appellate court should
not be altered without such evidence.
"§1039.-EQUITY CASES.-The rules governing the effect of the erroneous admission or rejection of evidence in equity cases are much the
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same as those governing the effect in other trials
without a jury. The admission of incompetent evidence is not of itself reversible error; to be reversible error, it must be prejudicial. The admission
is not error if the decree is sustained by other
competent evidence or if the same facts are properly in evidence. It will be presumed that the
court gave the incompetent evidence no effect,at least the appellate court may disregard the
testimony and render such judgment as equity
and justice require." 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and
Error, Sec. 1039.
POINT 4
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF.

This part of the brief is in answer to Point III of
appellant's brief. The question raised by the appellant
is whether ·or not there i.s an obligation to ''do equity"
by reason of the claimed agreement between ~Ir. Outcalt
and Mrs. Ballard which was embodied in the codicil. Appellant stated :
"It is undisputed that Outcalt contracted for
the services of ~Irs. Ballard; that in pursuance
of said contract a codicil was executed: that Outcalt secretly repudiated the contract by revoking
the codicil in an olographic will executed four
days later: ...
". . . She kept her bargain in a re1narkably
faithful .and devoted 1nanner and now the Executor of Outcalt's estate seeks to aYoid the deed
which furnished the consideration for which she
has labored and which in effect would take from
this wmnan the property pron1ised for her labors"
(A p pe llan f s brief, pa,:.:;es .J-t-3G).
rrhis a rgnment illustrates the confusion of the appellant as to the issues of the east>. Inconsistent with the
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"Statement of the Case" by appellant, appellant's theory
has been as if she were entitled to enforce the terms of a
contract or of the codicil. It will be recalled that the
codicil has not been admitted to probate but on the contrary the subsequent ologr.aphic will has been admitted
to probate and the time for contest has elapsed. No
claim was filed as a necessary basis for the enforcement
of any contract between the appellant and the deceased.
There was no b.asis for the defendant to prove a contract
and no need for plaintiff to go into the question of the
validity of such contract, the validity of the codicil or
whether or not Mrs. Ballard performed under the same.
By the terms of the agreement Walker Bank & Trust
Company was to have been the sole judge of whether or
not she had performed her agreement if she was to recover .anything under it or under the 0odicil. Walker
Bank & Trust Company has not been asked by her nor
permitted to make such a determination. Appellant's
argument is therefore founded upon a misconception of
the issues in this case.
There is some suggestion of an agreement entered
into between Mrs. Ballard and the deceased when she
secured the deed, he supposedly having requested her
to remain with him until his death and she having agreed
to this. Appellant's Point III, that plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief unless equity is done is necessarily based upon the premise that plaintiff is otherwise
entitled to equitable relief. It therefore presumes the
invalidity of the deed itself. If by reason of duress, sickness, incompetency or imposition by the defendant the
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deed is invalid, there cannot have been any valid agreement or contract between the parties simultaneously
therewith. The argument under Point III so far as any
contract or agreement which .she claims to have made
with the decedent in connection with the deed must fall
of its own weight under a finding that the deed was invalid. If the deed is valid the question does not arise.
Furthermore, the maxim that plaintiff must do
equity in order to be entitled to relief is not a hard and
fast rule. Nor is a party entitled under such rule to
claim legal rights. The rule is stated in the case of PanAmerican Petroleum Co. v. United States, 9 F. 2d 761,
~s follows:
"We .are unable to affirm the court below in
holding that the United States, in order to obtain
the relief which it sought, is required to credit
the defendants with the sums which they expended
under the leases and contracts, and in holding applicable to the case the maxim that he who seeks
equity must do equity. That maxim is as old as
equity itself, and is of almost universal application. It means that he who seeks the aid of an
equitable court subjects himself to the imposition
of such terms as the settled principles of equity
require. But the maxim is only a guiding principle
and not an exact rule governing all rases. Hanson
v. Keating, 8 J ur. 949. In that case the Yire
Chancellor .said:
" 'It is .a rule which per se can by no possihilit~· decide what the rights of the defendant are.
It only raises the qr:.cstion what equity. if any, the
defendant has against the plaintiff in the circumstances of the ease to which the rule is sought to
be applied.'"
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Mrs. Ballard has been treatE:ld equitably if that is a
tnaterial question. She gave tip no employment or position of advantage to tak~ care of Mr. Outcalt. She was
given room and board. 'rhe pay was not large, but whether
it shoiild have been tnore or less has not been determined
by evidence directly on the :rna tter. When Mr. Outcalt
was ambulatory she received $25 or more per month in
addition to room and board. Appellant claims at page 4
of her brief that his condition improved frotn August
1953 until shortly before his death which would mean that
he required very little care. The record, however, is
co:tltrary to this and he was seriously ill in July and
August of 1954 when her pay was increased to $100 per
month. This continued through the end of 1954. She
thereafter received substantially $75 per month. He required meals, which at times we will assume were at irregular hours and he otherwise required the care of the
usual bedfast patient. He was not an unkind ·or tyrannical person. Evidence shows that he was very .appreciative
of what was done for him. Mrs. Ballard is now to receive,
in addition to the considerat1on above mentioned, onethird of the residue of his estate. The estate will amount
to between $9,000 and $10,000, it having been shown that
the home is worth substantially $9,000 and there being
some additional property. No one can feel that Mrs.
Ballard has not been well treated.
CONCLUSION
The findings ·bf the trial cotirt are clearly sustained
by the evidence. Plaintiff was not required to show by
direct evidence that Mr. Outcalt was imposed upon at the
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moment he signed the deed. This was shown by the relationship of the parties, by the motives which defendant
had to secure herself by the deed and by the strange
circumstances as to its preparation, signing, supposed
witnessing and acknowledgment. These are particularly
strange when considering that Mary Glen usually prepared his papers, that he was a man ·of orderliness and
regularity in business affairs and that it would have
been a simple matter to have the document regularly
witnessed and acknowledged. The relationship of the parties required proof by Mrs. Ballard of regularity.
Exhibit 11 was properly admitted. Even so, it was
only one piece of evidence consistent with the entire circumstances otherwise proving invalidity of the deed. Because of its admission defendant was permitted to testify
as to her conversations .at the time of the deed which
otherwise would not have been admissible. A reading
of this record requires the same finding if Exhibit 11
were eliminated.
Equity and justice have been done for ~Irs. Ballard
according to any reasonable standard. Of great importance is the fact that the trial court has given effect to the
intention of the decedent. The judg1nent of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully subnlitted,
l\L\RR. \YILKIXS & C~\XXOX
PAUL B. CAXNOX
RICHARD H. XEBEKER
'Aitorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
920 Continental Bank Building
Salt L.ake City, Utah
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